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POLICE MISCONDUCT, VIDEO RECORDING,
AND PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT*
HOWARD M. WASSERMAN**
The story of police reform has become the story of video and
video evidence, and “record everything to know the truth” has
become the singular mantra. Video, both police-created and
citizen-created, has become the singular tool for ensuring police
accountability, reforming law enforcement, and enforcing the
rights of victims of police misconduct. This Article explores
procedural problems surrounding the use of video recording and
video evidence to counter police misconduct, hold individual
officers and governments accountable, and reform departmental
policies, regulations, and practices. It considers four issues: (1)
the mistaken belief that video can “speak for itself” and the
procedural and evidentiary problems flowing from that mistaken
belief; (2) the evidentiary advantages video offers police and
prosecutors; (3) the effects of video on government decisions to
pursue criminal charges against police officers and to settle civilrights suits alleging police misconduct; and (4) significant
procedural limits on efforts to enforce a First Amendment right
to record, such as qualified immunity and standing.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1314
I.
“ALLOW THE VIDEO TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF” ........................ 1321
II.
EVIDENTIARY ADVANTAGES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT .... 1330
III. CITIZEN VIDEO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE
PROBLEM OF RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT .................................... 1335
A. Toward a First Amendment Right to Record .................... 1336
1. Scholarly Arguments...................................................... 1337
a. Seth Kreimer ............................................................. 1337
b. Justin Marceau and Alan Chen .............................. 1338
c. Carol Rice Andrews ................................................. 1338
* © 2018 Howard M. Wasserman.
** Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. Thanks to Jud
Campbell and Margot Kaminsky for comments on early drafts. Thanks to David Ardia,
Mary-Rose Papandrea and the editors of the North Carolina Law Review for inviting me
to participate in this symposium.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1313 (2018)

1314

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

d. Jane Bambauer ......................................................... 1339
e. Jud Campbell............................................................ 1340
2. Current Judicial Decisions ............................................ 1341
B. Procedural Barriers to Rights Enforcement ...................... 1342
1. Establishing Individual Liability................................... 1342
2. Legislative Limitations .................................................. 1347
3. Municipal Liability for Individuals Encounters .......... 1354
C. The Problem of Officer Discretion .................................... 1355
IV. VIDEO AND REMEDIATION ...................................................... 1358
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 1362

INTRODUCTION
The story of police reform and of “policing the police” has
become the story of video and video evidence. “Record everything to
know the truth” has become the mantra. Video has become the
singular tool for ensuring police accountability, reforming lawenforcement policies and practices, and vindicating and enforcing the
constitutional rights of victims of police misconduct. Video can
vindicate the public’s rights against police misconduct, assist the
government in punishing misbehaving officers and departments, and
enable agencies to reform problematic and constitutionally defective
policies and practices. From the law-enforcement perspective, video
enables officers to prove that their conduct was constitutionally
appropriate, avoiding civil and criminal liability for the officers and
their departments. And government can use video to rebut criticism
that it is failing to protect the public.
Videos of police-citizen encounters fall into three categories. The
first is police-controlled video, which is created from body cameras,
dashboard cameras, traffic-light cameras, and other governmentcontrolled and -operated surveillance technology. The second is
citizen1-controlled video, created from smart phones and cell phones,
small digital video and audio recorders, private-business surveillance
cameras, and similar privately owned, controlled, and operated
recording technology, shared through texts, blogs, and socialnetworking sites. The third, although less-discussed, is live
mainstream media coverage of large or breaking police-public

1. I use the word “citizen” to mean all members of the public, without intending to
distinguish individuals who are citizens of the United States and individuals who are
otherwise present in the United States, lawfully or otherwise.
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encounters,2 such as the saturation coverage of the protests cum riots
in Ferguson in 2014.3 Mainstream media also enhances the power and
force of the first two categories by publicizing and distributing “viral”
videos created by other sources.
Arming everyone, public and private, with recording devices
produces a balance of power in which all sides record police-public
encounters. Big Brother is watching the people, but the people are
watching Big Brother. Ric Simmons recognized the special potential
role of citizen-controlled video in ensuring government
accountability: “It is now evident that Orwell’s vision was wrong.
Modern technology has turned out to be the totalitarian state’s worst
enemy . . . . [I]t is the people who are watching the government, not
the other way around.”4 Mary Fan praises this balanced “modern
condition where everyone has incentive to record to contest or
control the narrative.”5 She explains that
people and the police are recording each other from all
directions, making everyone at once surveilled and surveillor. I
am recording you, you are recording me, and the police are
recording us too, because the people demand it. The lines of
power and control radiate from all directions as people seek to
document their perceptions and thus shape the narrative.6
Jocelyn Simonson identifies institutionalized mutual surveillance
in the practice of “organized copwatching—groups of local residents
who wear uniforms, carry visible recording devices, patrol
neighborhoods, and film police-citizen interactions in an effort to
hold police departments accountable to the populations they police.”7
Multiple constituencies support expanded use of body cameras
and similar recording technology as the solution to police misconduct
and the catalyst of police reform. Fan argues that this universality of
2. See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT
LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 257–58 (2009); Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision:
Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 604 (2009).
3. Candice Norwood, Media Framing in Black and White: The Construction of Black
Male Identity, in FERGUSON’S FAULT LINES: THE RACE QUAKE THAT ROCKED A
NATION 167, 167–68 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2016); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral
Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 832–33 (2015).
4. Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s
Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
531, 532 (2007).
5. Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 908 (2017).
6. Mary D. Fan, Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police Body Camera
Videos, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1643 (2018).
7. Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 391 (2016).
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support demonstrates the “interest convergence thesis,” in which the
“convergence of diverse interests across unusual bedfellows . . .
create[s] a major shift in the recording of police encounters in the
United States.”8
Broad public support for video technology is reflected in opinion
polls9 and in support for a WhiteHouse.gov petition begun shortly
after the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown and corresponding protests
in Ferguson, Missouri.10 The Obama Administration and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under Attorneys General Eric
Holder and Loretta Lynch promoted video as a path to police reform.
Efforts included grants to law enforcement agencies to establish or
enhance body-camera programs, such as $75 million awarded in
December 201411 and $20 million awarded to 106 agencies in
September 2016.12 The DOJ entered consent decrees in civil rights
actions13 against police departments in Ferguson14 and Baltimore15
that required both departments to establish and maintain effective
body-camera programs. Federal body-camera bills have been offered
in Congress.16 A 2014 joint report by the DOJ and the Police
8. Fan, supra note 5, at 927.
9. Sharp Racial Divisions in Reactions to Brown, Garner Decisions: Many Blacks
Expect Police-Minority Relations to Worsen, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/08/sharp-racial-divisions-in-reactions-to-brown-garnerdecisions/ [https://perma.cc/U9YE-JJ5A].
10. See Aja J. Williams, Petition Asking Cops to Wear Body Cameras Passes 100K,
USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics
/2014/08/20/mike-brown-law-petition/14336311/ [https://perma.cc/P8SS-93UV].
11. David A. Harris, John Murray Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, University
of Pittsburgh School of Law, Collection and Use Panel Discussion at the North Carolina
Law Review Symposium (Nov. 3, 2017) (recording available at https://vimeo.com/groups
/275981/videos/24211131 [https://perma.cc/A3L7-BRVF]).
12. Department of Justice Awards over $20 Million to Law Enforcement Body-Worn
Camera Programs, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/department-justice-awards-over-20-million-law-enforcement-body-worn-camera-programs
[https://perma.cc/36AH-EUYH].
13. See 34 U.S.C.A. § 12601(b) (West 2017) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141).
See Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 741–44
(2017) (explaining the history and operation of § 14141 civil actions).
14. See Consent Decree at 1, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-CV-000180CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/833431/download
[https://perma.cc/2K7J-PHBE].
15. See Consent Decree at 1, United States v. Police Dep’t of Balt., No. 1:17-CV00099-JKB (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2017), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3284089
/Conset-Decree-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJW2-CWNW].
16. See Police Creating Accountability by Making Effective Recording Available Act
of 2015 (Police CAMERA Act), H.R. 1680, 114th Cong. (2015); Arthur Delaney, Adam
Schiff Pushes Body Cameras for Cops, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2014 11:55 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/27/body-worn-cameras_n_5722762.html [https://perma.cc
/2S4S-T5TF].
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Executive Research Forum (“PERF”) offered more than thirty
recommendations for state and local departments in establishing body
cameras, the central point being that agency policies and training
materials must provide clear, specific, and detailed guidelines on all
aspects of the use of cameras.17 The 2015 Final Report of the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing identified new
policing technology, including cameras, as a pillar of modern policing
and recommended expanded study and use.18 The American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) drafted model body-camera legislation,
requiring that officers record all encounters, subject to limited
exceptions, with broad disclosure of videos.19
Two stakeholders do not share this enthusiasm. One is rank-andfile police officers and officer unions. Initially supportive, they have
backed away, concerned with lack of control over the decision when
to record and over subsequent release and use of the resulting video,
fearing officer embarrassment or worse.20
The more problematic holdout is the Trump Administration and
the DOJ under Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who reject the basic
premise of the need for local police reform or of federal oversight as a
vehicle for achieving it. Shortly after President Trump’s inauguration,
the White House web page announced a policy of “Standing Up For
Our Law Enforcement Community.”21 The new Administration
would “honor our men and women in uniform and . . . support their
mission of protecting the public,” insisting that the “dangerous antipolice atmosphere in America is wrong [and] the Trump
Administration will end it.”22 Early in his tenure, Sessions pledged to
17. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN
CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 38–49 (2014),
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementi
ng%20a%20body-worn%20camera%20program.pdf [https://perma.cc/4983-AK2Z].
18. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 31 (2015),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY7R-3GC9].
19. A Model Act for Regulating the Use of Wearable Body Cameras by Law
Enforcement, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/model-act-regulating-use-wearable-body
-cameras-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/DX2S-TU4R].
20. See Bryce Clayton Newell & Ruben Greidanus, Officer Discretion and the Choice
to Record: Officer Attitudes Towards Body-Worn Camera Activation, 96 N.C. L. REV.
1525, 1549–50 (2018); Michael D. White & Henry F. Fradella, The Intersection of Law,
Policy, and Police Body-Worn Cameras: An Exploration of Critical Issues, 96 N.C. L. REV.
1579, 1584 (2018).
21. Dara Lind, Trump’s White House Site Promises to End the “Anti-Police
Atmosphere” in America, VOX (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/1/20/14338632
/trump-whitehouse-gov-blue-lives-matter [https://www.perma.cc/4NL6-PFKG].
22. Id.
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pull back from his predecessors’ aggressive use of civil actions and
consent decrees imposing federal judicial oversight of local police
departments, in favor of helping police officers better perform their
jobs without undermining respect for law enforcement or making
officers’ jobs more difficult.23 Sessions later issued a memorandum
identifying a series of principles the department would seek to
advance, including promoting officer safety, officer morale, and
public respect for police work.24 It is not clear how cameras and video
fit the administration’s new mission and focus with respect to police
reform—whether they help police better perform their jobs or
whether they reflect an anti-police attitude and a new means of
interfering and undermining respect for police.
The Trump Administration’s recalcitrance on police-controlled
recording places in stark relief the dramatic and immediate change
from the Obama Administration with respect to all federal efforts at
police reform. The ancien administration made extensive use of
§ 14141 civil actions for equitable relief against patterns-and-practices
of constitutionally violative behavior in state and local lawenforcement agencies, obtaining consent decrees against more than
thirty departments.25 The Trump Administration and Sessions DOJ
doubt that patterns and practices of constitutional misconduct exist,
as opposed to occasional lone bad actors.26 It remains to be seen how
that worldview affects the use of police- or citizen-controlled video.
Following the transition to the new administration, the DOJ asked
the court for a ninety-day delay in approving the Baltimore consent
decree to allow it to revise or reconsider the agreement; the district
judge refused, insisting that the time for negotiation had passed.27
Citizen-controlled video has become as prominent and essential
to reform efforts as police-controlled video. The Ferguson and
Baltimore consent decrees required both departments to recognize,
respect, and train officers to protect the right to “observe and record
23. Kevin Johnson, Attorney General Jeff Sessions: ‘We Are in Danger’ of Rising
Violence, USA TODAY (Feb. 28, 2017, 12:39 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/politics/2017/02/28/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-we-danger-rising-violence/98524544/ [https://perma.cc
/CKQ5-HNL5].
24. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3535148-Consentdecreebaltimore.html [https://perma.cc
/9LZ3-Z2WZ].
25. Rushin & Edwards, supra note 13, at 779.
26. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, supra note 24.
27. Daniel Victor, Judge Approves Consent Decree to Overhaul Baltimore Police
Department, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/baltimorejustice-department-police-consent-decree.html [https//perma.cc/PV3T-92VV (dark archive)].
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officers in the public discharge of their duties in all traditionally
public spaces”28 and to “peacefully photograph or record police
officers performing their law enforcement duties in public.”29
Ferguson previously acknowledged First Amendment protection for
the right to record in a consent decree resolving a § 1983 action
arising from the 2014 protests.30 Six federal courts of appeals—the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,31 Ninth
Circuit,32 First Circuit,33 Seventh Circuit,34 Fifth Circuit,35 and Third
Circuit36—have recognized a First Amendment right for members of
the public to record police and other public officials performing their
public functions in public spaces. In 2012, the DOJ adopted the
litigation position that “[r]ecording governmental officers engaged in
public duties is a form of speech through which private individuals
may gather and disseminate information of public concern, including
the conduct of law enforcement officers.”37
Late 2017–2018 offers an opportune moment to consider video
and its role in police reform, in criminal prosecution, and in civil
rights litigation surrounding citizens’ right to record police-public
encounters. This period marks significant technological anniversaries.
The iPhone, which has made citizen video pervasive, turned ten in
2017,38 while digital video-recording technology, alone and in cell
phones, is about fifteen years old.39 More than half of adults in the
United States have smartphones and more than ninety percent have
cell phones.40 Dashcam technology was introduced in the late 1980s
but became prominent approximately twenty years ago in the early
28. Consent Decree, supra note 14, at 26.
29. Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 84.
30. See Order by Consent at 1, Hussein v. Cty. of Saint Louis, No. 4:14-cv-1410-JAR
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2014); Complaint at 1, Hussein, No. 4:14-cv-1410 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 14,
2014).
31. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
32. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).
33. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
34. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012).
35. Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017).
36. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017).
37. Letter from Jonathan M. Sharp, Chief of Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Mark H. Grimes, Office of Legal Affairs, Balt. Police Dep’t (May 14, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/05/17/Sharp_ltr_5-14-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7TH-ZCUV].
38. Arielle Pardes, iPhone Turns 10: How It Became the Everything Machine, WIRED
(June 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/iphone-turns-10-how-it-becamethe-everything-machine/ [https://perma.cc/D8UG-RDMU].
39. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 339–40 (2011).
40. Fan, supra note 5, at 907.
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2000s, promoted through federal funding for recording technology in
response to an increase in public assaults on officers and in allegations
of police abuse.41 Body camera technology developed in Britain in
2005 and came to the United States around ten years ago.42
This period also marks significant legal and political
anniversaries. The transition in civil rights enforcement commitments
from Obama to Trump is in full swing more than one year into the
Trump presidency. It has been ten years since the Supreme Court in
Scott v. Harris43 approved summary judgment based on dashcam
video of a police chase, concluding that video evidence can “speak for
itself”44 in telling a singular story with which no reasonable jury could
disagree.45 It has been eight years since publication of the Harvard
Law Review article in which Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Daniel
Braman destroyed the underlying premise of Scott, showing that what
that video (and, by logical extension, all video) showed depended on
who was watching.46 And it has been ten years since Simmons’s
insight, offered prior to the exponential acceleration of the
technological revolution of smartphones and body cameras, about
Orwell and the power of the public to watch, record, and check the
government.47
I have written about video evidence, in particular the insistence
that body cameras offer the solution to the problem of police
misconduct. I have described my position as uncertain-but-cautious
hope and support—cameras are a good idea, but the details of how
camera programs operate and how video evidence is used in litigation
and public debate matter.48 The rhetoric surrounding recording of
police must reflect the reality—the benefits of video and video
evidence
in
providing
police
transparency,
government
accountability, and litigation accuracy, while perhaps real, should not
41. Bradley X. Barbour, Big Budget Productions with Limited Release: Video
Retention Issues with Body-Worn Cameras, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1725, 1730–31 (2017).
42. Id.
43. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
44. Id. at 378 n.5.
45. Id. at 380.
46. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 837, 841 (2009).
47. Simmons, supra note 4, at 531.
48. Howard M. Wasserman, The Uncertain Hope of Body Cameras, in FERGUSON’S
FAULT LINES: THE RACE QUAKE THAT ROCKED A NATION, supra note 3, at 217, 218
[hereinafter Wasserman, The Uncertain Hope]; Howard M. Wasserman, Recording of and
by Police: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 543, 547 (2017);
Wasserman, supra note 3, at 833; Wasserman, supra note 2, at 608–09.
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be overstated. And “perhaps” is an important qualifier, as a recent
study of body cameras involving more than 2000 officers in
Washington, D.C. showed no “detectable average effects” on
documented uses of force, citizen complaints, or behavior by police or
citizens in public encounters.49 The more-mixed empirical record has
not dampened the technological enthusiasm, however.
This Article approaches the question of video and police reform
from a different angle. It explores procedural challenges in using
video in civil50 and criminal51 litigation challenging, ex ante or ex post,
law-enforcement misconduct; in the efforts to hold individual officers
or departments accountable; and in the efforts to reform
departmental policies, regulations, and practices. Part I criticizes the
continued belief among courts, government officials, and
commentators that video “speaks for itself,” the procedural and
evidentiary errors to which that belief leads, and the problems it
creates for civil rights enforcement. Part II considers the evidentiary
advantages video offers law enforcement in civil rights litigation—
whether prosecution and police using video in a criminal prosecution
against the citizen involved in the encounter or officers using video as
defendants in civil litigation. Part III explores the promise and limits
of citizen-created and controlled video, considering the existence and
nature of a First Amendment right to record police performing their
public duties in public and the problems in enforcing and vindicating
that right. Part IV considers the effects of video outside of litigation;
these include executive decisions to pursue criminal charges against
police officers for misconduct and to settle civil rights litigation in
response to public outrage at a video-recorded incident.
I. “ALLOW THE VIDEO TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF”
Scott v. Harris was a § 1983 action arising from a high-speed
police chase that ended when the pursuing officer intentionally
rammed the fleeing car, causing it to careen off the road and into a
ravine, leaving the driver permanently paralyzed.52 The primary
49. White & Fradella, supra note 20, at 1586–88; Randomized Controlled Trial of the
Metropolitan Police Dep’t Body-Worn Camera Program, LAB @ DC,
http://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/ [https://perma.cc/MLD3-75ZP]; Amanda Ripley, A Big Test of
Police Body Cameras Defies Expectations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/upshot/a-big-test-of-police-body-cameras-defiesexpectations.html [https://perma.cc/JG5Z-6X9T (dark archive)].
50. 34 U.S.C.A. § 12601 (West 2017) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141); 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 242.
52. 550 U.S. 372, 374–75 (2007).
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evidence in the record was dashcam video from the pursuing officer’s
squad car, which the Court posted to its website so it could “speak for
itself.”53 With only Justice Stevens dissenting, the Court held that
summary judgment in favor of the officer was proper on the driver’s
Fourth Amendment claim. The video told only one, “quite . . .
different” story from the driver’s testimony—that the driver, traveling
at a high rate of speed and weaving in and out of traffic, posed an
imminent risk to persons in the immediate area, making
constitutionally reasonable the use of force to terminate the chase
and end the threat to the public.54 Video, in the Court’s telling,
provided conclusive objective evidence telling a singular story. That
single story overrode, and allowed the court on summary judgment to
disregard, all competing evidence, including the victim’s testimony
that he was driving safely (if fast) and did not pose a threat to the
public because the roads were empty.55 The Court could disregard
that testimony because it was “blatantly contradicted by the
record”56—that is, by the video, which possessed one objective,
obvious meaning that a court could determine and that no reasonable
jury could understand differently, regardless of how it judged the
victim’s testimony and credibility.
The Scott Court fundamentally misunderstood video and video
evidence. Video does not possess a singular meaning or tell a singular
story to all viewers that obviates the need for a factfinder or grants a
court such leeway on summary judgment. Video functions as any
other piece of evidence—it captures and offers limited information
and its meaning must be processed and understood by whoever views
or hears that limited information.57
From the front end of what video presents comes the insight
familiar to every undergraduate film student—what a video “says” or
“means” is limited by what is inside and outside the camera’s frame,
what is included or not included in the image, and the “camera’s
perspective (angles) and breadth of view (wide shots and focus).”58
Meaning changes with the length of the video, steadiness of the

53. Id. at 378 n.5.
54. Id. at 379–80.
55. See id. at 378–80.
56. Id. at 380.
57. See Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1410–
14 (2018).
58. Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER &
CLASS 17, 29 (2008).
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camera,59 and other details of the recording, such as distances,
perspectives, light, color, sound, sound quality, visual quality, and
angles.60 “All films have a point of view or voice,”61 but the voice and
story change from different angles, details, perspectives, and points of
view reflected in different videos.62
The back end recognizes that video, like any other piece of
evidence, must be processed, interpreted, and understood by the
factfinder.63 The work of Dan Kahan and his coauthors at Yale’s
Cultural Cognition Project64 has explored and revealed the nature of
and influences on that interpretation.65 Their empirical studies expose
the fallacy of Scott and those who insist that video offers an absolute
truth or singularity. They show that video does not speak for itself:
what video “says” depends on who is watching and the priors each
viewer brings with her. Video’s meaning is affected by a complex
combination of cultural, demographic, social, political, racial, gender,
ideological, and experiential characteristics. That is, reasonable jurors
could disagree about the meaning of a video because that meaning is
influenced, if not determined, by the personal and political
characteristics each juror brings to her task of viewing, interpreting,
and understanding.66
Two Kahan studies are relevant to this discussion. The first is the
landmark 2009 study in Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe, in
which the authors took the Scott Court up on its offer to let video
speak for itself by showing the chase video to study participants.
While the majority of viewers in the study interpreted the video as the
Court had, the minority of viewers who disagreed with the Court’s
view shared demographic and ideological characteristics and “a
distinctive understanding of social reality that informs their view of

59. Id. at 38; Jessica Silbey, Criminal Performances: Film, Autobiography, and
Confession, 37 N.M. L. REV. 189, 202–03, 214 (2007); Jessica M. Silbey, Filmmaking in the
Precinct House and the Genre of Documentary Film, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 107, 147, 161
(2005) [hereinafter Silbey, Filmmaking].
60. Silbey, supra note 58, at 38; Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 59, at 146; Wasserman,
supra note 2, at 640.
61. Silbey, supra note 58, at 29.
62. Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 59, at 147.
63. Id. at 173.
64. Members, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCH.,
http://www.culturalcognition.net/members/ [https://perma.cc/7F7R-9F9U].
COGNITION
PROJECT
AT
YALE
LAW
SCH.,
65. See
CULTURAL
http://www.culturalcognition.net/ [https://perma.cc/7F7R-9F9U].
66. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct
Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 854–55 (2012); Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 841.
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the facts.”67 The second study is They Saw a Protest, in which the
participants viewed video depicting a crowd outside a building that
was alternately identified as a reproductive-health clinic or a military
recruitment center during the period in which openly LGBT persons
were barred from military service.68 Opinions about abortion and
about LGBT rights corresponded with whether a viewer saw a
peaceful-but-emphatic protest or a riot and threatening blockade of
the building.69
Both studies explain public reactions to high-profile video cases.
Positions and experiences on race, class, law-and-order, and the
theory of “broken windows” policing influence how viewers interpret
video of the strangulation death of Eric Garner at the hands of New
York City Police Officer Daniel Pantaleo.70 Viewer reactions to video
of protests and police attempts to break-up protests—for example, in
Ferguson and elsewhere following the shooting death of Michael
Brown71 or the non-indictment of Officer Darren Wilson in the
Brown shooting,72 or in St. Louis following the 2017 acquittal of
Officer Jason Stockley in the shooting death of Anthony Lamar
Smith73—track viewer positions on law-and-order, the freedom of
speech, the propriety of public protest in public spaces, and, likely,
the underlying events and judicial decisions being protested.74 A
viewer who believes that the protested shooting was wrongful and

67. Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 865, 886.
68. Kahan et al., supra note 66, at 862–65.
69. Id. at 883–85.
70. Joseph Goldstein & Marc Santora, Staten Island Man Died From Chokehold
During Arrest, Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2014, at A14.
71. Chad Flanders, Ferguson and the First Amendment, in FERGUSON’S FAULT LINES:
THE RACE QUAKE THAT ROCKED A NATION, supra note 3, at 197, 198, 206–07; see also
Annys Shin, Recalling the Protests, Riots After Fatal Police Shooting of Michael Brown,
WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/recallingthe-protests-riots-after-fatal-police-shooting-of-michael-brown/2017/08/01/9992f044-5a8d11e7-a9f6-7c3296387341_story.html?utm_term=.3a43b565bf10 [https://perma.cc/ZK8M-LFEZ
(dark archive)].
72. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer is Not
Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/fergusondarren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html [https://perma.cc/RJK7-XDF5 (dark
archive)]; Nicholas St. Fleur, Scenes From a Ferguson Protest in New York City, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/11/scenes-from-newyork-citys-ferguson-protest/383154/ [https://perma.cc/WVQ8-ZXTK].
73. Mark Berman, Wesley Lowery & Andrew deGrandpre, Police and Protesters
Clash in St. Louis After Former Officer who Shot Black Driver Acquitted on Murder
Charges, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/09/15/st-louis-tenses-for-verdict-in-murder-trial-of-former-police-officer/
[https://perma.cc/P6NE-X6HF (dark archive)].
74. Flanders, supra note 71, at 198.
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that public protest is essential First Amendment activity promoting
social change is more likely to see a constitutionally protected
peaceful protest broken up by overzealous police; a viewer who
believes the shooting was justified is more likely to see outnumbered
police struggling to maintain order against a lawless riot.
Nevertheless, courts and commentators continue to espouse
Scott’s mistaken position on the “truth” of recording evidence and
how it can be used in litigation. Video continues to be treated as an
objective, unbiased, transparent observer that evenhandedly
reproduces events for the viewer, providing raw, unambiguous, and
unbiased evidence showing conclusively and certainly what happened
in the real world. Courts continue to use video to relieve themselves
of traditional reliance on one-sided testimony to reconstruct events,
to check the fallibility of human perception, and to allow factfinders
to replay and perceive events free of adverseness, passion, and
partisanship that plague traditional witness testimony.75 Video
continues to be seen as more likely to be “much more accurate than
other means of conveying information,” which “increases the
credibility and reliability of expression but also . . . may allow more
information to be translated quickly and in a manner unfiltered by a
third-party account.”76 In recognizing a First Amendment right to
record, the Third Circuit argued that video “corroborates or lays
aside subjective impressions for objective facts.”77
The problem is a failure to distinguish persuasiveness from moral
certainty. Video may be a more “credible representation[] of that
reality” that can “persuade all the more powerfully[,] . . . generat[ing]
less counterargument and . . . retain[ing] [the viewers’] belief.”78
Video can “validate or undermine” accounts of events and “help
resolve the conflict not only for the parties immediately involved but
also in the interests of the broader community.”79 But courts must
resist what literature scholar Peter Brooks calls the “reality effect”—
that video is, in and of itself, the thing or event depicted, rather than
one more piece of evidence of the thing depicted that a factfinder can

75. Fan, supra note 5, at 955–56; Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and
Democracy in the Video Age, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1010 (2016).
76. Marceau & Chen, supra note 75, at 1009–10.
77. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017).
78. Richard K. Sherwin, Introduction, in POPULAR CULTURE AND LAW xi, xiv
(Richard K. Sherwin ed., 2006).
79. Marceau & Chen, supra note 75, at 1010.
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interpret, consider, and use.80 The failure to distinguish the concepts
undermines the process in which courts resolve disputes.
The Supreme Court repeated its mistake, this time unanimously,
in Plumhoff v. Rickard.81 The Court again approved summary
judgment in favor of the defendant officers on a Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim arising from a high-speed chase, again
understanding the dashcam video as telling one obvious story of a
plaintiff posing a grave risk to public safety that officers properly
terminated with deadly force, even at the risk of serious injury or
death to the “fleeing” motorist.82 As in Scott, the Court accepted that
the video in the record showed conclusively that the plaintiff posed a
threat to the public with his “outrageously reckless driving.”83 The
video “conclusively disprove[d]” the plaintiff’s allegations about
whether the chase was over, whether he intended to resume flight,
and whether he still was maneuvering the car.84 And the video
showed that the driver was “obviously pushing down on the
accelerator” and that he “threw the car into reverse ‘in an attempt to
escape.’”85 The Court could decide this from its review of the video,
with neither further proceedings nor factfinding necessary or
appropriate. Unlike Scott, Plumhoff did not acknowledge the role of
video in its decision. Justice Alito’s majority opinion recited facts and
described what happened during the chase, without identifying video
as the source of its facts or conclusions and without placing the video
on the Court website for the public to watch and consider.86 Only
references to video during argument87 and the Court’s emphasis on
Scott as controlling precedent revealed the video’s prominent role in
the case.
The evidentiary limits of video become clear in cases with
multiple or competing videos. A second video, taken from a different,
broader angle, tells a different and often contradictory story than
80. Peter Brooks, Scott v. Harris: The Supreme Court’s Reality Effect, 29 LAW &
LITERATURE 143, 147 (2017); see also Silbey, supra note 58, at 17–18; Jessica M. Silbey,
Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 36 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
493, 519 (2004).
81. 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
82. Id. at 2017–18, 2021–22; Howard M. Wasserman, Mixed Signals on Summary
Judgment, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1331, 1335–36 (2014).
83. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2021.
84. Id. at 2021–22.
85. Id. at 2021.
86. Id. at 2017–18.
87. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)
(No. 12-1117), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2013
/12-1117_6i79.pdf [https://perma.cc/93EV-QFLQ].
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does the first video from a body camera’s producing a limited-field
video that offers little context for a close-up image.88 There is a reason
that every witness to an incident or to police activities has her phone
out—each wants to create and maintain a unique record of events
because each recording provides a unique piece of evidence offering a
unique story.89 But if different videos of the same occurrence tell
different stories depending on the internal elements of that video—
especially a different angle and different width of visual field—no
single video can be correct or can tell the entire story.
Argument in 2017’s Hernandez v. Mesa90 produced an exchange
that should have revealed how courts have gone astray in their
reliance on video. Hernandez was a Bivens action against a borderpatrol officer arising from a cross-border shooting—the officer was
standing in the United States when he fired, while the victim, a
Mexican national, was standing at or near the Rio Grande culvert
marking the U.S.-Mexico border.91 The officer was cleared by a
departmental investigation.92 Several surveillance cameras captured
the incident, with one video from one camera circulating on
YouTube.93 During argument, the following colloquy occurred
between Justice Sotomayor and counsel for the United States:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: . . . And I understand you say the
government has investigated and sees the facts differently.
Have you seen the -- the film that appeared on the YouTube?
MR. KNEEDLER: I have.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I did, and I can’t square the police
officer’s account of this incident with that film.
MR. KNEEDLER: There were other videos. The -- the -- the
press release -- nothing in the record and nothing in a -- in a
public account -- * * * --- there was other evidence and other
video --surveillance videos that were taken into account in the
investigation.94

88. Stoughton, supra note 57, at 1401–02; Timothy Williams et al., Police Body
Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/W9MQJLHN (dark archive)].
89. Fan, supra note 6, at 1653–54.
90. 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam).
91. Id. at 2004–05.
92. Id. at 2005.
93. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50–51, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017)
(No. 15-118), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15
-118_3e04.pdf [https://perma.cc/65DK-SGAK].
94. Id. at 50–51.
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Unfortunately, everyone missed the point and its significance for
debates over cameras and video evidence (which were not the issues
before the Court). If other videos could justify a different result in the
departmental investigation despite one adverse video, no single video
can be conclusive as a matter of law. Every video offers one unique
perspective out of multiple perspectives on one story, none
necessarily truer than another.95 And if non-video evidence could
justify a different outcome in the departmental investigation despite
the adverse video, then contradicting non-video evidence should play
a similar role in civil rights litigation. A court should not grant
summary judgment based on its singular view of what video says
while disregarding contrary non-video evidence. As a court on
summary judgment cannot choose between competing witness
accounts,96 so should it not choose between competing videos or
between competing video and testimonial evidence. A factfinder
should be given an opportunity to review all disparate pieces of
evidence, determine their meaning and credibility, and make its
decision.
The public reaction to the outcomes of prosecutions of police
officers in cases with publicly disclosed body camera and dashcam
evidence illustrates the error of Scott and the correctness of Kahan’s
insights that video can have multiple reasonable meanings and
messages.97 In a string of notorious shooting cases, decisions not to
charge or convict police officers contradicted the wider public
perception of the videos, triggering public outrage, protests, and
demonstrations.98 Accepting that the public was not protesting the
outcome simpliciter—a white police officer was not convicted of
shooting an African-American person, ergo the outcome was unjust
95. Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note 59, at 147.
96. Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of
Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 772 (1989).
97. Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 841, 897.
98. See Berman et al., supra note 73; Davey & Bosman, supra note 72; Wesley
Lowery, Graphic Video Shows Daniel Shaver Sobbing and Begging Officer for His Life
Before 2016 Shooting, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/post-nation/wp/2017/12/08/graphic-video-shows-daniel-shaver-sobbing-and-begging-officer
-for-his-life-before-2016-shooting/?utm_term=.6d90c2ccef95 [https://perma.cc/6R9V-CVHD
(dark archive)]; Afi Scruggs, Tamir Rice Protesters Picket House of Cleveland Prosecutor
Timothy McGinty, GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2016, 5:44 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/jan/01/tamir-rice-protest-cleveland-prosecutor-timothy-mcginty [https://perma.cc
/UE2R-LFDK]; cf. Josh Saul, South Carolina Cop Pleads Guilty in Shooting that Sparked
Black Lives Matter Protests, NEWSWEEK (May 2, 2017, 4:21 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/south-carolina-police-pleads-guilty-shooting-unarmed-black-man
-593357 [https://perma.cc/8LHJ-VK9M] (detailing the guilty plea of an officer charged in a
police-shooting incident).
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and grounds for protest—the anger must have been based on
different perceptions, understandings, and conclusions from the video
evidence. And those different perceptions, understandings, and
conclusions derived from distinct demographics, political attitudes,
and life experiences that Kahan and his coauthors identified as
influencing how viewers understand video. That the public could
disagree with the prosecutor, grand jury, jury, or judge means video
cannot be singular—either different viewers reached different
conclusions about the meaning of the video or other evidence
affected the prevailing view of the video within the formal
proceeding. Either way, video did not present a single truth but could
be and was overcome by something beyond the images themselves.
It is not clear who reached the “correct” or “accurate” result in
these cases—the non-convicting factfinders or the righteously
indignant public.99 It does not matter. The point is that video is
subjective and courts, the public, and commentators err in assuming
its objectivity and singularity.
The judicial process must recognize and incorporate this insight,
as judges are uniquely equipped to do.100 Courts cannot throw away
the ordinary rules of evidence and procedure when video is part of
the record. A court on summary judgment cannot view the evidence
“in the light depicted by the videotape”101 because the videotape lacks
a singular light in which other evidence can be viewed. The video, as
any other piece of evidence, must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-movant on summary judgment because the jury
(or individual jurors) may (and statistically, some will) view the video
differently than the judge, based on their distinct attitudes and
experiences. And none of those competing viewpoints should be
boxed or rejected as unreasonable.102
That insight applies beyond summary judgment. At most trials,
video evidence will prevail over competing testimonial evidence
because factfinders see video as “more salient than verbal
descriptions.”103 Kahan’s studies about viewer interpretation and
scholarship about how video forms and presents its message therefore
remain significant at trial. They should remind courts that the place
for subjective interpretations of video and comparison with non-video
evidence is a trial before a factfinder, not summary judgment that
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 881.
Id. at 897.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007).
Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 884–86; Wasserman, supra note 2, at 641, 643–44.
Kreimer, supra note 39, at 386.
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preempts the ordinary civil-litigation process and labels competing
understandings of video unreasonable.104 They also should remind
factfinders in civil and criminal proceedings not to place blind faith in
video but to recognize its limitations and its connections with and
complementarity to non-video evidence. Video is one piece of
evidence among many. Factfinders must decide the case in light of all
the evidence, including their subjective and personal interpretations
in understanding and applying video evidence.
II. EVIDENTIARY ADVANTAGES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
Commentators have described the evidentiary advantages that
police officers enjoy in litigation, as witnesses in criminal prosecutions
against arrestees and as defendants in civil and criminal
proceedings.105 Judges and juries tend to view officers’ testimony as
more credible than that of citizens in a he-said/he-said contest
between one police officer and one suspect,106 an “ugly battle” that is
“highly imbalanced.”107 Judges and juries are reluctant to openly
discredit law-enforcement officer testimony, where an adverse finding
that the officer is lying or is not credible could destroy a career.108
Advocates argue that video evidence can overcome that
imbalance by offering objective information that does not depend on
credibility determinations or the subjectivity of adversary
proceedings.109 But the tendency to believe law-enforcement
testimony has migrated into how courts view video evidence, with the
jury (or court on summary judgment) more likely to adopt officers’
asserted interpretation of the video’s singular meaning and story at
the expense of a competing narrative of the video’s meaning. The
Supreme Court did this on summary judgment in Scott and Plumhoff.
Lower courts grant summary judgment for officers by relying on

104. Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 884–86; Wasserman, supra note 2, at 641, 643–44.
105. David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 455, 471–73 (1999); Mary D. Fan, Missing Police Body Camera Videos: Remedies,
Evidentiary Fairness, and Automatic Activation, 52 GA. L. REV. 57, 94–96 (2017); Richard
A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 429, 495 (1998).
106. Dorfman, supra note 105, at 471–72; Simmons, supra note 4, at 565.
107. Fan, supra note 105, at 95.
108. Id. at 31; Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About
It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1996).
109. Fan, supra note 5, at 955–56.
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ambiguous or apparently police-friendly video110 or by ignoring
adverse video.111 This tendency has accompanied a shift in law
enforcement’s view of the purpose of police-controlled video—not to
expose official wrongdoing or trigger government accountability, but
to obtain evidence for criminal prosecutions of members of the public
involved in those police encounters.112
The 2017 acquittal of former St. Louis police officer Michael
Stockley illustrates the tendency. Stockley was charged in state court
with murder arising from the shooting death of Anthony Lamar
Smith following a high-speed chase. The case presented numerous
recording-evidence issues. Dashcam video of the chase captured
Stockley during the chase telling his partner “we’re killing this
motherfucker.” Video of the aftermath showed Stockley walking to
the victim’s car, firing five shots, returning to his squad car and rifling
through a bag, then returning to Smith’s car. At that point, another
officer turned the dashcam off, leaving only a blurry cellphone video,
taken by a bystander, as evidence. That citizen-controlled video did
not clearly show whether Stockley was carrying a second gun (the
prosecution alleged that Stockley planted a gun in Smith’s car to setup a self-defense defense) when he went to Smith’s car the second
time.113
In a bench trial, the judge resolved every video issue in
Stockley’s favor. Recorded comments about “killing” Smith were
ambiguous, a means of releasing tension during the chase rather than
a statement of intent. The court drew no adverse inferences from
officers turning the dashcam off or from Stockley’s violating
department procedure in rifling through a bag in his car or moving
back and forth between Smith’s car and the squad car. And the
ambiguity of the blurry citizen video meant that the state had not
proven that Stockley planted a second gun.114

110. See Gillis v. Pollard, 554 F. App’x 502, 504–05 (7th Cir. 2014); Kalfus v. N.Y. &
Presbyterian Hosp., 476 F. App’x 877, 880–81 (2d Cir. 2012); Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509
F.3d 234, 239, 248–49 (6th Cir. 2007).
111. See Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App’x 791, 792 n.1, 796 (11th Cir. 2008). But see
id. at 799–801, 804 (Martin, J., dissenting) (emphasizing and detailing video in finding use
of force unreasonable).
112. Harris, Collection and Use Panel Discussion at the North Carolina Law Review
Symposium, supra note 11.
113. Jeremy Stahl, This Judge’s Excuses for Acquitting Jason Stockley of Murder are
Pathetic, SLATE (Sept. 15, 2017, 6:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/09
/15/this_judge_s_excuses_for_acquitting_jason_stockley_of_murder_are_pathetic.html
[https://perma.cc/98ZK-X7QR].
114. Id.
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The Sixth Circuit took a similarly officer-centric approach to
video on summary judgment in Marvin v. City of Taylor.115 The case
involved claims of excessive force arising from the arrest of the
plaintiff on a DUI charge and his transportation to the police station.
Events at the station house were videotaped, and the court relied on
the videos as the sole touchstone for its factual analysis in reversing
denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.116
The court went a step beyond Scott. It demanded that the video
affirmatively corroborate plaintiff’s testimony and show what the
court viewed as excessive force; it disregarded plaintiff testimony
because the video (as the court viewed it) did not affirmatively
support that testimony. The plaintiff alleged that one of the defendant
officers pulled him out of the car and threw him to the ground, but
the court insisted that the video did not clearly show this and refused
to credit the plaintiff’s testimony as a supplement. The video, taken
from the opposite side of the car and offering an obstructed view,
only showed the officer opening the door, reaching into the car,
closing the door, then bending down and helping the plaintiff to his
feet; it did not show the officer “abusing” the plaintiff. Although the
video, as understood, did not blatantly contradict the plaintiff’s
assertions as in Scott, it did not support them. And by not supporting
the plaintiff’s version of events, the video “certainly cast[] strong
doubts on [his] characterization.”117
The plaintiff in Marvin also testified that the officers had
gratuitously pulled his injured arm into the small of his back while
taking off the handcuffs from behind. According to the court, while
the video appeared to show the plaintiff’s arms being raised into the
small of his back, the officer also could be seen crouching when
inserting the key to unlock the cuffs, presumably to avoid making the
plaintiff raise his arms. Based on (their interpretation of) the video,
the judges concluded that “the officers’ conduct cannot reasonably be
construed as gratuitous.”118 The possibility of an officer-favorable
interpretation of the video justified the court adopting that
interpretation and granting summary judgment, regardless of
differing testimony.
The competing inferences from one video and between video
and testimony do work against law enforcement and in favor of the
public challenging police conduct.
115.
116.
117.
118.

509 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 236–43.
Id. at 240, 248–49.
Id.
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One example is the 2017 prosecution of activist Cristina Winsor.
Winsor was acquitted of misdemeanor charges of disorderly conduct
and walking in a roadway following her arrest during a police-reform
protest in New York City.119 The state trial judge found bystandercitizen video showed something “totally different” from what officers
said happened.120
Winsor’s case is unique and telling in several respects. The judge
viewed the officers as “quite credibl[e]” on “first blush,”121 reflecting
the common judicial tendency. That conclusion turned only after the
judge viewed the video. The more common case moves in the other
direction—video looks bad for the officer (as do many videos of
violent encounters and police use of force),122 but is overcome by the
officer’s testimony as to his belief about things not shown in the video
or by his explanation and justification for what the video appears to
show.
The contradictions between the officers’ testimony and the video
of the protest at which Winsor was arrested were obvious and
objective. They did not revolve around issues of discretion, judgments
of what was reasonable in the moment, or questions of what the
officer might have subjectively feared from the suspect. They were
about objective elements in the video such as whether scaffolding
blocked the sidewalks (the officers said there was none, while the
video showed some)123 or the presence of white-shirted officers (the
officers said none were present, while the video showed white-shirted
officers on the scene).124 These video images required less
interpretation, making them less subject to demographic factors
affecting perception and interpretation, compared with video of what
might or might not be a peaceful protest or what might or might not
constitute excessive force.
The stakes in a proceeding also affect how a trial court
approaches and interprets video, as they do other evidentiary and
119. Shayna Jacobs, Judge Acquits BLM Activist in NYPD Prosecution Case, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017, 5:43 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/judgeacquits-blm-activist-nypd-prosecution-case-article-1.3537057 [https://perma.cc/HN77-T7QP].
120. See id.; see also Transcript of Proceedings at 9, 14–15, New York v. Winsor, No.
2016 SN 039363 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.almcms.com/contrib/content
/uploads/documents/292/20206/Winsor-transcript.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S9SJ-EVUQ];
Andrew Denney, NYPD Investigating Officers’ Alleged Misrepresentations in Court, N.Y.
L.J. (Oct. 4, 2017, 6:01 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID
/1202799625742/ [https://perma.cc/5PHE-XEAR].
121. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 120, at 9.
122. Wasserman, supra note 2, at 646–47.
123. Jacobs, supra note 119.
124. Id.
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legal judgments.125 Judges and juries may be willing to view video less
favorably to law enforcement in a misdemeanor summons case such
as Winsor’s compared with a high-value § 1983 action for excessive
use of deadly force by a plaintiff killed126 or seriously injured127 or a
murder prosecution of a police officer arising from performance of his
dangerous duties in a dangerous situation.128
A second example involves a § 1983 action arising from the use
of deadly force in a traffic case, with the court approaching video in
the proper way that Plumhoff and Scott declined. In Lewis v. Charter
Township of Flint,129 the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment,
rejecting that the video conclusively showed the plaintiff posed any
danger to the officer or others in the area and repeatedly insisting
that the court must view the video in the light most favorable to the
non-moving plaintiff.130 The dissent unintentionally captured the
competing approaches to video evidence, arguing that the majority’s
finding of competing possible conclusions “is not the video I have
reviewed.”131
The evidentiary advantage may be enhanced when officers do
not utilize police-controlled video technology. In her study of the
frequency of police recording, Fan finds that officers often ignore
departmental regulations for police-controlled recording, fail to
record events, or fail to record them fully and completely.132
Removing video from the evidentiary record returns the factfinding
weight to competing testimony, restoring the officer’s evidentiary
advantage.
Fan seeks to undo the evidentiary benefit and thus the perverse
incentive not to record or not to record fully. She proposes that courts
exclude partial or incomplete recordings (where the officer
improperly failed to record all appropriate portions of the encounter)
and impose a positive inference that the missing video would have
provided information supporting the citizen (whether as criminal
defendant or civil rights plaintiff) and running against the officer or

125. Cf. Ziglar v. Abbassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1884–85 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(comparing damages and injunctive relief); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 115 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (comparing criminal and § 1983 proceedings).
126. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2012–15 (2014).
127. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375 (2007).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 81–86.
129. 660 F. App’x 339 (6th Cir. 2017).
130. Id. at 344–45.
131. Id. at 347 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
132. Fan, supra note 105, at 67–74.
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the state.133 This places a thumb on the evidentiary scale in favor of
the public’s civil rights without requiring courts to find that an officer
intentionally hid or destroyed evidence of misconduct.134
III. CITIZEN VIDEO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE PROBLEM
OF RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
The trend moves towards having less rather than more publicly
visible police-created video by narrowing the frequency of camera use
and the availability of resulting video. The 2014 PERF Report
recommended that departmental policies give officers discretion over
when to record, which has become the common position.135 Most
departments surveyed adopted a “limited discretion model”; officers
were required to record certain enforcement activities and given
discretion to record others but given no guidance about whether or
when to record consensual encounters, the incidents in which many
violations occur.136 In Michael White’s words, if recording is not
mandated, an incident will not be recorded.137 That approach
comports with the preferences of rank-and-file officers.138 Police
departments and governments also have resisted making the resulting
videos broadly available, adopting “blanket or overly broad
exemptions from public disclosure.”139 States exempt dashcam and
body-camera videos from open-records or FOIA laws,140 with
departments using video more for internal training than for public
awareness of police activity or for establishing police liability and
accountability to the public.
Exacerbating that problem is officers failing to record (or to
record fully and completely), even when required to do so by laws
and department regulations, as Fan describes in her studies.141
Officers turn off or fail to engage cameras, whether erroneously or
133. Id. at 34–35.
134. Id. at 33–34, 36–38.
135. See Wasserman, The Uncertain Hope, supra note 48, at 227 see Fan, supra note 5,
at 931; White & Fradella, supra note 20, at 1621; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra
note 17, at 40–41.
136. Fan, supra note 5, at 931–32; White & Fradella, supra note 20, at 1641.
137. White & Fradella, supra note 20, at 1628.
138. Newell & Greidanus, supra note 20, at 1548; White & Fradella, supra note 20, at
1638.
139. Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68
ALA. L. REV. 395, 442–43 (2016).
140. Id. at 411–15; Nixon Signs Bill Limiting Access to Police Body Cam Videos, FOX 2
NEWS (July 8, 2016, 4:25 PM), http://fox2now.com/2016/07/08/nixon-signs-bill-limitingaccess-to-police-body-cam-videos/ [https://perma.cc/Q89U-2EDP].
141. Fan, supra note 105, at 67–74.
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intentionally, resulting in non-recording or selective and partial
recording of events.142 Formal departmental policies, even those
requiring broader recording, yield to officer practices on the ground,
undermining the accountability and transparency goals and
amplifying the “gross imbalance in power” between police and the
public.143
Fan’s proposal that courts adopt inferences adverse to the
government where video is inappropriately unavailable reduces some
government incentive to limit the creation and availability of video.144
The broader answer to decreasing police-controlled video must be
increasing citizen-created and -controlled video to fill the gap. This
ensures recordings of many police-public encounters regardless of
departmental policies or officers’ conformity with policies.
But citizen video fills those gaps only if members of the public
are constitutionally entitled and practically able to record police
activity and their interactions with officers. Taking as a given the
existence of the right as elaborated by courts and commentators, this
Part considers the problems in recognizing, enforcing, and vindicating
that right, whatever its nature, source, and scope.
A. Toward a First Amendment Right to Record
Six federal courts of appeals agree that the First Amendment
grants individuals the right to record police and other officials in the
course of performing their public duties in public spaces—the
Eleventh Circuit,145 Ninth Circuit,146 First Circuit,147 Seventh Circuit,148
Fifth Circuit,149 and Third Circuit.150 The lone contrary view came
from Judge Posner dissenting in the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the
privacy concerns of individuals recorded interacting with police
should prevail over any First Amendment interests the recorder may
claim in hearing and electronically capturing that interaction.151 But
Seth Kreimer argues that at least the early decisions recognized the
right to record by assertion more than by explanation or argument.152
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 65, 69–74.
Id.
See id. at 98, 100–103; supra text accompanying notes 132–34.
See Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
See Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).
See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).
See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012).
See Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017).
See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2017).
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 611 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Kreimer, supra note 39, at 368–69.
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Scholars and courts have moved beyond the early efforts to identify
the source, nature, and scope of the constitutional right to record.
1. Scholarly Arguments
No single free-speech theory links the scholarly arguments in
support of the First Amendment right to record. But each offers a
sound basis for some constitutional right.
a.

Seth Kreimer

Kreimer explores the expressive landscape created and defined
by the emergence of “pervasive image capture,” the combination of
digital photography, ubiquitous cell-phone cameras, and online
venues for image sharing. The result is that
almost any image we observe can be costlessly recorded, freely
reproduced, and instantly transmitted worldwide. We live,
relate, work, and decide in a world where image capture from
life is routine, and captured images are part of ongoing
discourse, both public and private. Capture of images has
become an adjunct to memory and an accepted medium of
connection and correspondence.153
Like words inscribed on parchment, captured images are
expressive, part of the cultural and political discourse. First
Amendment protection attaches to all such expressive images,
whether used publicly or whether the individual creates images with
the intent to use them. Pervasive-image capture allows individuals to
record and reflect on their memories and experiences, an essential
component of the freedom of thought the First Amendment
guarantees.154 And the technological ease of capturing and recording
those images cannot be disaggregated from the technological ease of
disseminating them, as both are part of a “broader digital ecology of
communication.”155
Citizen recording is constitutionally essential to balance official
police-controlled recording. Images are often more salient than verbal
descriptions—more powerful in their persuasive ability,156 if not
necessarily more accurate or more singular in meaning. “Participants
in public dialogue who are barred from capturing images are at a
substantial discursive disadvantage vis-à-vis those who can record
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 337.
Id. at 341–43, 381.
Id. at 381.
See Sherwin, supra note 78, at xiv.
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from life. Officials engage in virtually unchecked surveillance of
public encounters. A rule that bars citizens from capturing images
gives unbalanced authority to official framing.”157
b.

Justin Marceau and Alan Chen

Building off Kreimer’s argument about advancements in digital
recording and distribution, Marceau and Chen argue that this
“creates transformative ways for individuals to participate in
democracy and inform public discourse about not only political and
social issues but also broader understandings about the truths of the
universe, including complex moral questions,” such as abortion, food
safety, and police misconduct.158 Recording “adds to the body of
knowledge about the most controversial aspects of contemporary
society.”159 And if recording itself is not a species of expression, image
capture is conduct “essential to speech”; as writing, speaking, and
other conduct used for expression are speech, so is the creation and
production of images that may be exhibited and viewed.160
The scope of the right that Marceau and Chen define varies by
context. The Constitution protects the right to record in locations
where the recorder “has a legal right to be present.”161 This includes
publicly accessible spaces, on one’s own private property, on
another’s private property with that owner’s consent or knowledge,
and on private property without owner consent where the recording
pertains to a matter of public concern or has a strong connection to
public discourse.162 The right remains subject to reasonable, contentneutral time, place, and manner restrictions,163 and it may yield to
government interests, including protection of personal privacy.164 But
nondisruptive recording in public—the paradigm for citizens
recording police officers performing police functions—should remain
immune from government regulation.165
c.

Carol Rice Andrews

Writing before the twenty-first century explosion of citizencontrolled recording technology, Andrews grounds a right to record
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Kreimer, supra note 39, at 386.
Marceau & Chen, supra note 75, at 1000.
Id.
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1027–28, 1031.
Id. at 1032–33, 1038.
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1053–54.
See id. at 1033–34.
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in the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, identifying a core right to
file winning civil rights claims against government officials in court.166
That right to seek and obtain legal remedies from government
officials through formal government channels is at least as important
as the right to engage in general public speech about those officials.167
The petition right also requires “breathing room” in the form of
broader protections for related non-core petition activities.168 One
non-core activity is the right to file losing civil rights suits, a buffer to
secure the core right of filing winning suits.169 That is, an individual
can file winning suits only if she retains a right to file all suits and to
risk losing.
A second non-core right should be recording the public lawenforcement misconduct giving rise to those winning civil rights
claims, whether the recording is created by the injured person or by a
bystander observing the encounter. Recording both “captures” the
transaction or occurrence giving rise to the winning claim and
“preserves” evidence of the event with which a plaintiff may be able
to prove that winning claim.
d.

Jane Bambauer

Bambauer begins from the premise that the First Amendment
protects the “creation of knowledge. Expanded knowledge is an end
goal of American speech rights, and accurate information, along with
other, more subjective expressions, provides the fuel.”170 She
identifies a negative “right to create knowledge” as a “latent
prerequisite for free expression. Speech does very little for a
government’s constituents if it is not supported by commitments to
free thought and information flow.”171 This right ensures that
government “will not interfere unduly with its constituents
learning.”172
Protecting the creation of knowledge includes protecting
electronic data as speech.173 Speaking of photography with reasoning
that applies to live-action video and audio recording, Bambauer
argues that the First Amendment protects the photographs or other
166. See Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 663–64 (1999).
167. Id. at 685.
168. See id. at 680–83.
169. Id. at 683.
170. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014).
171. Id. at 86.
172. Id. at 87.
173. See id. at 70.
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recordings, not the act of creating those recordings. But the “very
purpose of a photography ban is to prevent a wider audience from
seeing the scene” photographed, so government-imposed restrictions
or bans on photos (and necessarily on video- and audio-recording)
must be understood, and declared invalid, as “designed to cut down
on communicative potential.”174 A “law prohibiting the creation,
maintenance, or distribution of digital information attempts to
achieve its social goals by limiting the accumulation of knowledge.
Data privacy laws strive to give individuals the power to decide who
does and does not get to learn about them.”175
e.

Jud Campbell

Campbell defines “speech-facilitating conduct” as conduct, often
non-expressive, that facilitates or enables speech.176 He adopts an
“anti-targeting rule” under which laws regulating non-expressive
conduct raise free-speech problems when singling out and targeting
speech or the speech process.177 This anti-targeting rule best explains
protection for recording:
Cameras and other audiovisual recording devices are
conventional means of communication—that is, they are
conventionally used for communicative purposes. Targeted
regulations of audiovisual recording thus single out conduct
commonly associated with expression and impose an apparent
disproportionate burden on speech.178
Campbell praises the Seventh Circuit decision in ACLU of
Illinois v. Alvarez179 enjoining enforcement of the Illinois
eavesdropping statute as applied to listening to and recording police
officers performing public functions during public events.180 The
statute operated “at the front end of the speech process by restricting
the use of a common, indeed ubiquitous, instrument of
communication.”181 The court recognized that the statute burdened
First Amendment rights “directly, not incidentally,” by “specifically
target[ing] a communication technology.”182 On Campbell’s model,

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 83.
Id. at 90.
Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2016).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 50–51.
679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 602–03.
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the law targeted communication technology that, even if not
expressive in every use, had “readily apparent disproportionate
effects on speech.”183
2. Current Judicial Decisions
In 2017, two federal courts of appeals sought to move beyond
Kreimer’s criticism that the right to record had been announced but
not explained by locating the right to record within existing First
Amendment doctrinal and scholarly norms.
The Fifth Circuit identified an amalgam of the right to film, the
right to gather information, and the right of listeners to receive
information.184 The Third Circuit added the right to access
information about official activities—recording is one way to more
accurately observe, see, and hear what officers do in public.185 That
court also emphasized what Vincent Blasi labeled the First
Amendment’s “checking value,” under which the press and public
speak as a means to expose and stop government misconduct.186
Citizen-controlled video offers new and different perspectives that
compete with official versions of events, enabling members of the
public to perform a role similar to that of the news media.187
Both courts also acknowledged the increase in police-controlled
recording, which could not be allowed to stand alone. Citizencontrolled video supplements police video in spurring departmental
change, aiding and furthering investigations of wrongdoing, and
confirming dead-ends where no wrongdoing occurred.188
By framing the right in this way, the Third Circuit removed from
the constitutional calculus whether the recording citizen intended to
disseminate or use the resulting video. Requiring intent produced
too-limited a right. An individual may not develop the intent to put
the recording to expressive use until later, once she has an
opportunity to review the recording and to reflect on the story the
video tells (in her subjective and politically determined view). It
makes no constitutional sense to allow officers to prevent an
individual from recording based on that individual’s present intent,
thereby depriving her of the opportunity to develop different intent
183.
184.
185.
186.

Campbell, supra note 176, at 53.
See Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 687–90 (5th Cir. 2017).
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3rd Cir. 2017).
See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 609–10.
187. Fields, 862 F.3d at 359–60; Wasserman, supra note 2, at 615–16.
188. Fields, 862 F.3d at 359–60; Turner, 848 F.3d at 689.
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once she knows more about the recording and the events captured
and reflected in that recording.189

B.

Procedural Barriers to Rights Enforcement

Courts have defined and enforced the right to record in a way
that produces an odd paradox. Governments and government officials
have a perverse incentive to record or to require recording of as few
encounters as possible and to disclose as little video as possible,
whether through policies, officer discretion, or officer disregard for
their regulatory obligations. Uniform recognition of a First
Amendment right to record should restore the balance—if officers do
not record and preserve a record, members of the public will.
But police officers have a complementary incentive to limit
public recording or disclosure by involved citizens and bystanders,
thereby eliminating any video or audio record of an encounter. The
result is absence of any record of a police-public encounter gone
wrong, leaving proof to the he-said/he-said testimony that favors
police and government officials.190 Mere recognition of that First
Amendment right is not sufficient; the right must be vigorous in its
scope and in its enforcement. Unfortunately, procedural limitations
on civil rights litigation may limit the enforceability of the First
Amendment right and its effectiveness in checking police misconduct.
1. Establishing Individual Liability
Constitutional challenges to police efforts to prevent citizens
from recording—constitutional claims to vindicate the First
Amendment right to record—typically arise in § 1983 actions against
individual officers, seeking damages for past, completed rights
violations. In the typical right-to-record case, officers prevented an
individual from recording a completed encounter, then the individual
sued the officer for damages. Recording plaintiffs may find that it is
“damages or nothing”191 because no other proceedings allow them to
assert and vindicate that right. In most cases, the recorder is not
arrested or charged for attempting to record.192 Or the recorder is
released after a brief “conversation,” likely designed to deter the
189. Fields, 862 F.3d at 358; ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2012).
190. Dorfman, supra note 105, at 471–72; Fan, supra note 105, at 94–96; Leo & Ofshe,
supra note 105, at 495; supra Part II.
191. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
192. See Fields, 862 F.3d at 356 (discussing the consolidated case of Amanda Geraci).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1313 (2018)

2018] VIDEO RECORDING & RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT

1343

person from attempting to record in the future.193 Or the recorder is
arrested but charges are withdrawn when the arresting officer,
recognizing his speciousness, does not appear at the state
proceeding194 or when that proceeding reveals the basis for the
charges to be invalid.195
The Fifth Circuit cited this procedural posture to justify taking
the odd (and arguably inappropriate) step of determining and
announcing the scope of the First Amendment right and declaring it
clearly established “for the future” without determining whether the
officers violated the plaintiff’s rights at the time and on the facts of
the case.196 The court feared that a court could address the
constitutional issue only in this case or a procedurally similar damages
action, so it availed itself of the opportunity to resolve the merits issue
going forward.
But police officers and other executive officials can avoid
litigation and liability on all claims for constitutional damages through
the defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity provides that a
government officer can be liable for damages only for conduct that
violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time
of the conduct, such that a reasonable officer would have known that
his conduct violated the constitutional right at issue.197 No officer in
the Fifth or Third Circuit cases was held liable; all were granted
qualified immunity because the right to record was not clearly
established at the time of the challenged events.198 This followed two
Third Circuit decisions in which the court pretermitted the merits of
the First Amendment question and held that any constitutional right
that might exist had not been clearly established.199
The Supreme Court has made the qualified-immunity doctrine
strongly protective of police officers, particularly on Fourth
193. Turner, 848 F.3d at 683–84.
194. Fields, 862 F.3d at 356 (discussing the case of Richard Fields).
195. See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2011).
196. Turner, 848 F.3d at 687–88. But see id. at 697 (Clement, J., dissenting in part)
(questioning the propriety of the court announcing a constitutional right in this way);
Howard M. Wasserman, Qualified Immunity Meets Advisory Opinions, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Feb. 27, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/02/qualified-immunitymeets-advisory-opinions.html [https://perma.cc/43AA-N6PE].
197. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam); Reichle v. Howards, 132
S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012).
198. Fields, 862 F.3d at 360; Turner, 848 F.3d at 687.
199. True Blue Auctions v. Foster, 528 F. App’x. 190, 192 (3d Cir. 2013); Kelly v.
Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010); cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009) (holding that courts have discretion to consider the merits or the clearly
established prong as the first step in the immunity analysis).
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Amendment search-and-seizure and excessive-force claims, to the
point that it at least appears difficult to impossible to establish officer
liability.200 Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”201 A right is
“clearly established” only by a strong consensus of lower-court cases
with somewhat similar facts and officers acting in similar
circumstances, defining the right in light of the facts of which the
defendant officer was aware and not at too high a level of
generality.202 The Court has been coy about whether one binding
decision from a regional circuit is sufficient to clearly establish the
right within that circuit, assuming it might but never finding a right
clearly established based on a single lower-court decision.203 Policies
of the relevant executive department may provide officers with notice
of clearly established law.204 A right also may be so obvious that it can
be clearly established as general principle without factually similar
precedent,205 but the bar for obviousness is high.206 The result is the
Supreme Court holding that police officers were entitled to qualified
immunity in almost a dozen cases in the past decade—several of them
summary reversals of lower-court denials of immunity.207
The risk is that courts will apply qualified immunity in First
Amendment right-to-record cases in the same officer-protective
manner as in Fourth Amendment cases. The Third Circuit in Fields
concluded that the right to record was not clearly established despite
the unanimous view of (at the time) five sister circuits and every
district court within the Third Circuit to consider the question.208 It
also refused to accept Philadelphia Police Department policies and
200. See William Baude, Is Qualifed Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 101, 104
(2018); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2017); see
also Schwartz, supra, at 50 (“Although qualified immunity is rarely the reason that Section
1983 cases end, there are other ways in which qualified immunity doctrine might influence
the litigation of constitutional claims against law enforcement.”).
201. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam); Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308;
Aschcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).
202. White, 137 S. Ct. at 553; al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
614–15 (1999).
203. See Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam); Reichle v.
Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2095 (2012).
204. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 744 (2002); Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617.
205. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.
206. White, 137 S. Ct. at 552; Shafer v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117–18,
1117 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017).
207. See, e.g., White, 137 S. Ct. at 553; Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015) (per
curiam); Reichle, 566 U.S. at 663; al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 732; Baude, supra note 200, at 139–
40; Schwartz, supra note 200, at 9.
208. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 361–62 (3d Cir. 2017).
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regulations as a basis for clearly establishing the right. In the wake of
prior right-to-record decisions, the department adopted official
policies recognizing that citizens enjoyed a First Amendment right to
record police in public; the policy statements sought to eliminate
officers’ confusion on the street, to ensure officers knew their duties,
and to place the department “on the forefront rather than on the back
end” in understanding and respecting this developing constitutional
right.209 A Commissioner’s Memorandum stated that officers should
reasonably expect to be recorded or photographed and that they
“shall not” obstruct or prevent recording or disable the recording
devices.210 But the majority emphasized evidence that the policies
were ignored, were ineffective in informing officers that the
constitutional right existed, or were not being followed, meaning the
existence of the regulations could not show a knowing constitutional
violation.211 It pointed to testimony from one high-ranking
department official that, despite the written policies, officers did not
understand that there was a constitutional right to record.212
Despite recent decisions and scholarly consensus, future § 1983
plaintiffs seeking damages for the denial of the right to record may
encounter a number of problems. It is unclear whether six circuits
provide a sufficiently “robust” consensus213 to clearly establish the
right. It is not certain that the right is even clearly established in the
Third Circuit or the Fifth Circuit (despite the latter’s insistence that it
was clearly establishing the right “for the future”214), as the Supreme
Court has never recognized a right as clearly established in a circuit
by a single circuit-court decision.
The Third Circuit in Fields found the right to record was not
clearly established, insisting that no part of a broad canvas of existing
law and policy enabled defendant officers to understand their conduct
to be unlawful. Prior cases recognizing the right involved individuals
who recorded with the intent to publish or use the video, establishing
a right different from the right to record without clear intent to
publish that the plaintiffs exercised in this case.215 The Seventh Circuit
decision in Alvarez did not provide sufficient notice, as it involved a
constitutional challenge to an eavesdropping law prohibiting listening
209. Id. at 363 (Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 361 (majority opinion).
212. Id.
213. See Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam); City & Cty. of S.F.
v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015).
214. Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017).
215. Fields, 862 F.3d at 361–62.
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and recording without regard to later use or publication of any
recording216 (Jud Campbell agrees that Alvarez should not be
characterized as a right-to-record case because the statute prevented
only capture, not recording and dissemination).217
Even if sufficient to clearly establish, that lone precedent may
lack sufficient factual overlap. Distinctions are always possible and
seemingly small and insignificant differences between precedent and
current factual circumstances may be sufficient to avoid liability in a
doctrinal morass that one scholar compared to the “one-bite rule for
bad dogs[,] start[ing] over with every change in weather
conditions.”218
The Third Circuit suggested that there might be a
constitutionally meaningful factual distinction between recording a
traffic stop and recording a sidewalk confrontation,219 rendering the
right not clearly established in the different context. Factual
distinctions may prevent Turner v. Lieutenant Driver220 from clearly
establishing much in the Fifth Circuit. Dissenting, Judge Clement
emphasized that the plaintiff had been photographing the police
station building, which did not clearly establish the right to videorecord the building or the right to photograph or video-record officers
performing police functions.221
Any First Amendment right also remains subject to reasonable,
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions,222 such as the
officer’s needs for security and safety, for himself and others, in
performing dangerous functions. This compels a new inquiry in each
case into the details of the underlying events and circumstances and
whether the officer reasonably could have believed that the recording
interfered with his public duties, compared with previous incidents.
Overcoming qualified immunity and establishing constitutional
liability leads to a second hurdle—a claim that a police officer
prevented plaintiff from recording or momentarily stopped and
questioned her actions, although violative of the First Amendment,
may not produce substantial injury and may leave the plaintiff to
216. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2012).
217. Campbell, supra note 176, at 52.
218. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV.
207, 256 (2013).
219. Fields, 862 F.3d at 361; True Blue Auctions v. Foster, 528 F. App’x. 190, 192–93
(3d Cir. 2013).
220. 848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017).
221. Id. at 697 (Clement, J., dissenting in part).
222. Fields, 862 F.3d at 360; Turner, 848 F.3d at 688; Marceau & Chen, supra note 75, at
1032.
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recover only nominal damages.223 This is especially so in the
circumstances giving rise to Fields and Turner, where no arrests or
prosecutions followed and any seizures or detentions to prevent the
plaintiffs from recording lasted a short time.224 And liable officers
likely will not pay even that nominal-damages judgment, as the
government indemnifies officers in virtually all cases.225 The limited
remedy may remove the incentive for an individual to bring the
lawsuit, especially faced with overcoming qualified immunity. Rightto-record plaintiffs would benefit from James Pfander’s proposal to
allow § 1983 plaintiffs to forgo substantial damages and limit their
claims to nominal damages in exchange for the elimination of
immunity as a defense.226
Such disincentives or barriers to successful litigation decrease or
limit the amount and availability of citizen-controlled video, leaving
officers with the incentive to prevent recording where they can. A
determined officer might be willing to shut down a citizen’s recording
efforts. He avoids being recorded and having video of his misconduct
emerge (while already declining to activate his own recording
technology), taking a chance that some legal or factual distinction will
allow him to avoid liability in the subsequent § 1983 action or that any
judgment will be de minimis and paid by the municipality rather than
out of his pocket.
2. Legislative Limitations
Officers are not activating their police-controlled recording even
when required to do so by law or department regulation.227 Two
policymaking problems exacerbate that problem. One is inconsistency
as to the level at which recording rules and policies should be made—
state, municipal, or departmental—producing piecemeal and
confusing rules and obligations.228 The second is that those
policymakers, whatever their level, are enacting insufficiently broad
recording policies and excessively narrow disclosure policies.229
Citizen-controlled recording again should fill the gap when
formal regulations and practical conduct combine to limit the
223. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308–09 n.11 (1986).
224. Fields, 862 F.3d at 356; Turner, 848 F.3d at 683–84.
225. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890–91
(2014).
226. See JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR
146–48 (2017).
227. Fan, supra note 105, at 71.
228. Fan, supra note 5, at 928–29.
229. Id.
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available video evidence around a police-public incident. But the
same state, local, and departmental legislative efforts that limit the
creation and availability of police-controlled recording could be
aimed at citizen-controlled recording.
In 2015, Texas Representative Jason Villalba introduced a bill
defining the existing crime of interrupting, disrupting, impeding, or
interfering with a peace officer to include “filming, recording,
photographing, or documenting the officer within twenty-five feet of
the officer,” or within one hundred feet if carrying a gun, with an
affirmative defense that the recorder was a member of or working for
the media.230 The obvious target, as the media carve-out
demonstrated, was citizens recording their police encounters or
encounters they witnessed between police and other members of the
public.
Such a bill violates the First Amendment, running afoul of the
newly recognized right to record, including in the Fifth Circuit. It
treats expressive conduct less favorably than non-expressive
conduct—or, in Jud Campbell’s framing, it treats non-expressive
conduct that facilitates speech less favorably than non-expressive
conduct unconnected to the speech process.231 A person could stand
within twenty-five feet of a peace officer, even when carrying a gun, if
not otherwise impeding the officer, so long as not engaged in the
(expressive or pre-expressive) act of recording; the identical person
operating a recording device breaks the law. But either person
implicates the purported interest in non-interference with police
functions.
This bill also treats media members more favorably than nonmedia persons performing the same recording function. It is not clear
how a media member recording within twenty feet of the officer
interferes or impedes more than a non-media member in the same
time and place or why media members should be treated more
favorably than non-media members engaged in identical expressive
(or pre-expressive) conduct.232 Although the right to record remains
subject to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, such
230. H.B. 2918, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015) (amending TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 38.15 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2017 Reg. Sess and First Called Sessions of
the 85th Legis.)); Neena Satija, Texas a Flashpoint in National Debate Over Right to Film
Police, TEX. TRIBUNE (May 9, 2015, 2:01 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/05/09
/reveal-story-1/ [https://perma.cc/EC3V-6NDG].
231. Campbell, supra note 176, at 15, 53.
232. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 659 (1994) (“Regulations that
discriminate among media, or among different speakers within a single medium, often
present serious First Amendment concerns.”).
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special disfavored treatment of citizen-controlled recording is not
neutral as to speaker or content.233
Villalba withdrew the bill after receiving criticism from everyone
on all sides of the political spectrum.234 But his failed effort does not
mean that state, local, or department officials lack the identical
motivation to protect officers from the perceived harassment and
negative attention that comes from being subject to constant
recording through competently drafted laws.235 As long as the First
Amendment right to record remains subject to limitations,
policymakers may attempt to restrict when or how recording should
take place in service of purportedly neutral values such as noninterference, officer safety, public safety, or protection of officer and
public privacy.236
That such legislation violates the First Amendment in the
abstract does not resolve the issue. Nor does the argument that the
purported governmental interests are either pretext for government
wanting to hide matters from public scrutiny or should not be strong
enough to justify a ban on public recordings.237 Right-holders must
overcome numerous procedural hurdles to enforce and vindicate that
constitutional right and to obtain judicial remedies barring
enforcement of these formal laws, at least without having to endure
state enforcement and prosecution for attempting to record.
A person arrested or prevented from recording a police
encounter pursuant to a formal anti-recording law or policy could sue
the arresting officer for damages for violating her First Amendment
rights, the same strategy as those prevented from recording by an
officer exercising individual discretion. That plaintiff confronts the
same problems described above—qualified immunity and the nominal
value of the claim to a prevailing plaintiff.238
In fact, this plaintiff faces a greater qualified-immunity hurdle,
because the officer can defend his action on the ground that he was
enforcing presumptively valid state law239 or department

233. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 604 (7th Cir. 2012).
234. Allison Wisk, Bill to Limit Filming of Police Activity Is Dropped, DALL. NEWS
(Apr. 2015), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-politics/2015/04/10/bill-to-limit-filming
-of-police-activity-is-dropped [https://perma.cc/LY29-M5X6].
235. See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 363 (3d Cir. 2017) (Nygaard, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Kreimer, supra note 39, at 346.
236. See Marceau & Chen, supra note 75, at 1033–34.
237. See id. at 1033.
238. Supra text accompanying notes 223–26.
239. See Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 1994).
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regulations;240 he therefore was neither plainly incompetent nor
knowingly violating the First Amendment. The plaintiff would have
to meet the burden of establishing that the statute or regulation was
obviously and blatantly unconstitutional, such that no reasonable or
not-plainly incompetent officer could have believed the recording ban
could be valid and enforceable.241
A plaintiff might instead sue the municipality, arguing that the
officer arrested her pursuant to a constitutionally defective formal
policy enacted by a final policymaker.242 Municipalities cannot assert
immunity defenses,243 so the plaintiff could recover (if only nominal
damages) for the violation, even if the right was not clearly
established or if there are factual distinctions between her case and
prior cases. But if the challenged recording prohibition derived from a
state statute (such as Villalba’s bill in Texas), the constitutional
violation in a case of arrest by a municipal or county police officer
would have been caused by state law.244 Municipal liability requires
that the constitutional violation be caused by that municipality’s
policies or ordinances, not the policies of another entity that the
municipality enforced. A local practice or policy of enforcing all state
law is not sufficient to establish liability for its enforcement of any
particular constitutionally deficient state statute. Unless the
municipality took additional steps to adopt the state prohibition
against recording as a municipal ordinance or to promulgate a formal
local policy of enforcing that specific state law, a plaintiff will be
unable to establish entity liability.245
A third option is a pre-enforcement action against state or local
officials to enjoin enforcement of the anti-recording law as violating
the First Amendment. Qualified immunity does not apply in actions
for equitable relief.246 Instead, pre-enforcement plaintiffs face
standing problems.
Under O’Shea v. Littleton,247 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,248 and
Clapper v. Amnesty International,249 courts are reluctant to accord
240. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617–18 (1999).
241. Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1209.
242. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
243. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650–51 (1980).
244. Los Angeles Cty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2010); Vives v. City of New
York, 524 F.3d 346, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2008).
245. See Vives, 524 F.3d at 353; N.N. v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 670 F. Supp. 2d 927,
933–34 (W.D. Wis. 2009).
246. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
315 n.6 (1975); Schwartz, supra note 200, at 13.
247. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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standing to plaintiffs challenging law-enforcement policies and
practices that affect the plaintiffs only when police attempt to enforce
other valid substantive laws against them. The plaintiffs in O’Shea
lacked standing to challenge discriminatory state-court charging, bail,
and sentencing practices; the claim required impermissible
speculation that at some future point the plaintiff would be arrested
for violating a constitutionally valid substantive criminal provision
and become subject to the challenged criminal procedures.250 The
plaintiff in Lyons lacked standing to obtain an injunction barring city
police from future use of a constitutionally dubious chokehold; he
could not predict if or when he would be stopped by police for a
traffic or other legal violation, if or when the encounter would go
south, and if or when the chokehold would be applied to him.251 The
plaintiffs in Clapper lacked standing to challenge a federal law
permitting certain national-security surveillance; they could not
predict if or when they or people they communicated with would be
targeted for surveillance, successfully surveilled, and surveilled
through the challenged law in government efforts to enforce other
federal criminal and national-security laws.252
Consider how and when a prohibition on recording would be
enforced. An officer seizes or initiates an encounter with a person for
some crime, infraction, or matter; that person attempts to record the
encounter; and the officer prevents her pursuant to the anti-recording
law. Or a person comes upon an officer seizing another person for
some crime, infraction, or matter; the person attempts to record that
encounter; and the officer breaks from his seizure of the first target to
stop the recorder pursuant to the anti-recording law. Standing for any
pre-enforcement challenge requires the court to “speculate” that the
plaintiff will be seized by police or will witness another person being
seized by police for some other conduct or crime, that she will
attempt to record, and that she will be prevented from recording that
incident by the officer enforcing the recording ban.253 A court may be
unwilling to accommodate such conjecture prior to enforcement, as
opposed to in an action in which the police completed the
infringement of the First Amendment by preventing recording and

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

461 U.S. 95 (1983).
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496–97.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108.
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147–50.
Id. at 1148–50; Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108.
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the plaintiff seeks a retroactive remedy (and faces the hurdle of
qualified immunity).254
Courts apply more relaxed standing analysis to pre-enforcement
First Amendment challenges; judges are more willing to allow
plaintiffs to preemptively raise their constitutional rights, rather than
requiring them to engage in the targeted expressive (or preexpressive) conduct and risk arrest and enforcement of the
constitutionally suspect law.255 Even in First Amendment cases, a
plaintiff must show “an intention to engage in a course of conduct
arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a
statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution
thereunder.”256 She must show a present intention to engage in the
statutorily prohibited expressive activity at a specific, imminent
future, subjecting herself to likely enforcement.
The ACLU established standing in Alvarez, although the court
recognized that the organization “does not know precisely when it or
its employees would face prosecution or which officers would be
involved.”257 The court did not demand a showing of intent to record
at any particular imminent protest. It distinguished Lyons because the
threat of prosecution did not hinge on unknowable future events or
details of how a violation would occur. The ACLU sought to
implement an organizational program of recording police at future
“‘expressive activity’ events—protests and demonstrations—in public
fora in and around the Chicago area.”258 Because such events were
certain to occur and because the ACLU’s organizational policy and
practice was to attend and record many or all of those events, the
organization’s activity and the likelihood of enforcement against them
moved beyond speculative, even if it could not identify the date of the
event to be recorded.
Media members might be able to establish standing along similar
lines. The media’s job is to observe, record, and report on public
events, so enforcement of the statute against them is less speculative;
they will report on and attempt to record future events such as public
protests or rallies that are certain to occur and at which police may
attempt to enforce a statutory recording ban. Of course, media

254. Cf. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing
actual prevention of recording).
255. Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2010).
256. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct 2334, 2342 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v.
Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
257. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 593–94 (7th Cir. 2012).
258. Id. at 588.
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organizations and individuals working for media organizations were
exempt from Villalba’s proposed Texas bill259 and the Illinois law at
issue in Alvarez,260 and likely would be exempt from similar legislative
prohibitions on recording.
Jocelyn Simonson’s copwatchers261 also may be able to establish
standing. They operate in organized groups of local residents
patrolling neighborhoods in planned times, places, and manners,
monitoring police conduct, educating citizens, and undertaking other
efforts to deter police misconduct before it occurs.262 Video-recording
is one recent addition to copwatchers’ repertoire263 and their
recording is as deliberate, scheduled, and organized as their patrol
activities.264 Like the ACLU and the media, their regular organization
and consistent activities allow them to show present intent to record
inevitable future events through their regular planned activities, even
if the date or place of the events recorded and of enforcement of the
recording ban is unknown at the time of litigation.
Ordinary, spontaneous, individual citizen-recorders acting on
their own may not be so fortunate. They will be less able to show
when or where they will witness or be involved in an individual
encounter that they want to record, lacking formal job obligations or
organizational plans to attend events or encounters at which
recording, and efforts to enforce a recording ban, will occur. Unable
to show when or where they want to record an encounter, they will be
less able to show when or where the recording ban will be enforced
against them. Those isolated, individual events look more like
O’Shea, Lyons, and Clapper, where the when and how of a future
encounter with law enforcement and attempted enforcement of the
challenged law is less known and more speculative or conjectural.
But the individual right to record police is most essential in these
below-the-radar, individual police-public engagements. It is difficult
to stop dozens of media members or hundreds of protesters with
cameras from recording a public protest or expressive event (although
police tried during the Ferguson protests265), other than by halting the
259. H.B. 2918, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015) (amending TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 38.15 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2017 Reg. Sess and First Called Sessions of
the 85th Legis.)).
260. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 604.
261. Simonson, supra note 7, at 408.
262. See id. at 408–11.
263. See id. at 408.
264. See id. at 410.
265. See Order by Consent, supra note 30, at 1; Flanders, supra note 71, at 203–05;
Wasserman, supra note 3, at 831–32.
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protest event, which raises separate, more fundamental First
Amendment concerns.266 Police traditionally accorded media
members freer rein in covering protests and other events, although
some of that deference was lost in the Ferguson protests and since.267
Citizens who engage in copwatching describe a mutual respect
between themselves and the officers they observe, a sense that both
sides are doing their jobs, with no sign of officers trying to intimidate
the watchers or stop their activities, including recording.268
Spontaneous and isolated individual recorders do not receive
similar respect or deference. It is easier for police to prevent a single
recorder from capturing a single random encounter, giving officers a
greater incentive to do so. Yet standing doctrine may place these
encounters beyond pre-enforcement constitutional challenge. The
result is a paradox—it is easier for police to enforce an arguably
constitutionally violative prohibition on recording but more difficult
for plaintiffs to preemptively challenge its constitutional validity.
3. Municipal Liability for Individuals Encounters
A plaintiff can establish municipal liability by showing that the
municipality failed to properly train its officers or to establish
sufficient policies guiding their conduct and that this failure caused
the officer to violate that plaintiff’s rights in an individual
encounter.269 Where an individual officer exercises his discretion to
prevent an individual from recording, that individual might show that
municipal policymakers did not provide constitutionally adequate
policies or training to instruct officers that citizens have a First
Amendment right to record and that officers must allow such
recording to occur.
In Fields, the Philadelphia Police Department promulgated
regulations and adopted policy statements announcing a
constitutional right to recording and reminding officers that they
should reasonably expect to be recorded or photographed and that
they “shall not” obstruct or prevent recording or disable the
266. ZICK, supra note 2, at 257.
267. See Flanders, supra note 71, at 203–05; Jonathan Peters, When a Journalist is
Arrested Covering a Protest, What Should the News Outlet Do?, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/protest-arrests-journalismst-louis.php [https://perma.cc/R5ZH-J59L]; Jonathan Peters, Journalists in Ferguson:
Know Your Rights, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Aug. 21, 2014), https://archives.cjr.org
/united_states_project/press_rights_in_ferguson.php [https://perma.cc/3LFB-Z4GD].
268. See Simonson, supra note 7, at 410.
269. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011); Brown v. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty.,
520 U.S 397, 406–07 (1997).
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recording devices.270 But the policies were ignored, were ineffective in
informing officers that the constitutional right existed, or were not
being followed; most officers were not aware the constitutional right
existed.271 A municipality can be liable for establishing inadequate
policies or for disregarding officers who do not adhere to adequate
policies. But such failure-to-train liability is for “limited
circumstances,” constrained by strict causation and state-of-mind
requirements272 making it difficult for plaintiffs to prove.
The Fields plaintiffs tried to establish failure to train through
evidence of officers ignoring or being unaware of those policies.273 In
this respect, municipal liability becomes the mirror of the individual
defense of qualified immunity—what triggers municipal liability
supports qualified immunity, while what overcomes qualified
immunity suggests the absence of municipal liability. The Fields
majority criticized the plaintiffs for attempting to use department
policies and training to have it both ways—insisting that the policies
clearly established the First Amendment right to record while arguing
that the policies were “utterly ineffective” in conveying to officers the
nature and details of that right.274
C.

The Problem of Officer Discretion

Police-controlled video is marked by three trends: departments
according officers discretion as to whether, what, and when to
record;275 officers wielding that discretion in narrow ways;276 and
officers failing to follow regulations when required to record.277 The
trends are self-reinforcing, as every failure to record can be defended
as an exercise of sound discretion.
It is reasonable to expect that officers would be less likely to
record—intentionally or otherwise, as a matter or discretion or
otherwise—an encounter that has gone sideways and may embarrass
the recording officer or his fellow officers. Fan offers a 2016 incident
in San Francisco, in which sheriff’s deputies beat a suspect with metal
batons, inflicting head and arm injuries requiring twelve days of
270. 862 F.3d, 353, 363 (3d Cir. 2017) (Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
271. Id. at 361 (majority opinion).
272. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61–63; Brown, 520 U.S. at 407.
273. Id.
274. Fields, 862 F.3d at 361.
275. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 17, at 40–41; Fan, supra note 5, at
931–32; White & Fradella, supra note 20, at 1599–1604.
276. Fan, supra note 105, at 65, 69–71; Wasserman, supra note 48, at 558.
277. Fan, supra note 105, at 69–71.
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hospitalization; ten of the eleven involved officers failed to activate
their body cameras, and the one who activated his camera did so by
accident.278
It also is reasonable to expect that officers, vested with similar
discretion by legislation or policy, will be inclined to stop a citizen
from recording an encounter that has gone sideways and that may
produce video embarrassing one or more officers or make them look
bad to the viewing public. The unrecorded 2016 incident in San
Francisco came to light because a private video-security system
captured the incident, and the owners of the system turned the video
to the public defender.279 Had the officers been vested with power and
discretion to stop that recording or its release, they likely would have
exercised it.
Qualified immunity protects executive discretion, to give police
officers “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken
judgments”280 and to provide wide latitude for the vigorous exercise
of constitutional judgment and discretion, rather than forcing them to
steer too clear of the constitutional line out of fear of liability.281 Antirecording legislation vests officers with additional discretion and an
additional weapon to control citizens and to eliminate potentially
embarrassing video. This undermines the force of citizen-controlled
video in establishing or restoring balance between police and the
public in capturing images and in ensuring police accountability.282
It is not clear how First Amendment doctrine might respond to
this problem. Executive officers cannot wield unbridled and
untrammeled enforcement discretion with respect to speech, as in
granting parade permits.283 But discretion is inherent in policing,
including as to what laws to enforce, how, and when.284 A plaintiff can
state a First Amendment claim by showing that adverse police action
was motivated by animus or disagreement with the message or
content of her speech and with the intent to stop or retaliate because
of her speech, although pleading and proving intent proves difficult
for plaintiffs.285 Campbell’s framework for protecting speech278. Id. at 69.
279. Id.
280. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).
281. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 388–90 (2012); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167–68
(1992); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525–26 (1985).
282. See Fan, supra note 105, at 95–96; Kreimer, supra note 39, at 386.
283. See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992).
284. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005).
285. See Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2014); McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F.3d 45,
62–64 (1st Cir. 2004).
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facilitating pre-expressive conduct can map onto that intent standard;
subject heightened First Amendment scrutiny applies to laws and
regulations that target the speech process by targeting recording as a
speech-facilitating activity.286
An officer who prevents a citizen from recording, whether
pursuant to a statutory recording ban or his own discretion, targets
the speech process when he is motivated by the desire to eliminate
video that might expose him or his fellow officers acting in
unconstitutional, or simply embarrassing, ways.287 This standard
would have been satisfied in the events underlying Fields, as police in
two separate incidents approached recorders with the intent of
stopping otherwise non-interfering recording of potential police
misconduct.288
But courts may overlook content-discriminatory animus in
retaliatory-arrest or retaliatory-prosecution cases where the officer
had probable cause to arrest, because the causal connection between
animus and injury (the arrest or prosecution) becomes more
attenuated when probable cause exists.289 Plaintiffs in citizen-video
cases thus face the same proof difficulties in showing that the officer
intended to halt recording to avoid being shown performing his public
functions in an inappropriate manner, rather than because he
reasonably and with probable cause believed the recording interfered
with legitimate law enforcement activities.
*

*

*

Citizen-controlled video, enhanced by a vigorous First
Amendment right to record government officials performing official
functions in public spaces, should be the answer to limits on the
amount and availability of police-controlled video. But procedural
realities of qualified immunity, limits on standing, unavailability of
substantial damages, limits on municipal liability, and limits on proof
make enforcement of that right difficult. Those difficulties together
limit the force of citizen-controlled video as a tool for police reform
or accountability.

286. See Campbell, supra note 176, at 15, 50–51.
287. Marceau & Chen, supra note 75, at 1033–34.
288. See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2017).
289. Reichle v. Howards, 55 U.S. 658, 667–68 (2012); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250,
251 (2006); cf. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 681 F. App’x 746 (11th Cir. 2017), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 447 (2017) (granting certiorari to decide whether the existence of
probable cause defeats a retaliatory-arrest claim as a matter of law).
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IV. VIDEO AND REMEDIATION
Video’s role is not limited to litigation or the courtroom; it
affects how government and the public react to police-public
encounters and the public policy response to those encounters. The
public takes to the streets to protest what it perceives as injustice.
And the public is more likely to take to the streets when people can
see and interpret video and when the results of formal legal processes
do not match their assessments and interpretations of that video.290
In responding to incidents of police-involved force, the
government must account for the public’s visceral, brute-sense
impressions and interpretations of a video, recognizing the Kahan
insight that those impressions are determined by identity, ideology,
political leanings, demographics, and experience. Regardless of how
policymakers interpret and understand a recording, they must
consider different reactions from a public adopting a different
interpretation that becomes more outraged if government and
government institutions do not respond in (what the viewing public
regards as) an appropriate fashion.
Governments respond to this concern in several ways. One is to
attempt to change the laws to keep video from becoming public,
thereby limiting the public response and public outrage. This explains
Jason Villalba’s legislative effort to ban citizen recording of police.291
And it explains efforts to exclude body-camera videos from public
disclosure laws.292 In 2016, Missouri enacted a broad, blanket
exemption from its open-records laws for body-camera and dashcam
video, arguing that making video public would interfere with ongoing
police investigations.293 That decision followed the state attorney
general’s commission recommendation and the attorney general’s
warning of technology “lead[ing] to a new era of voyeurism and
entertainment television at the expense of Missourians’ privacy.”294
But as Fan argues, “blanket or overly broad exemptions from
public disclosure . . . defeat” the basic transparency and accountability
goals of police-controlled recording.295 Video becomes a tool for
protecting and exonerating officers against public complaints within
290. See White & Fradella, supra note 20, at 1623–28.
291. Supra text accompanying notes 230–36.
292. Fan, supra note 5, at 942.
293. Nixon Signs Bill Limiting Access to Police Body Cam Videos, supra note 140.
294. Jesse Rifkin, After Ferguson, Missouri Legislator Wants to Keep Police Videos
Private, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2015, 1:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015
/02/23/ferguson-police-body-camera-videos_n_6735600.html [https://perma.cc/M5VT-N7PD].
295. Fan, supra note 139, at 442.
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the department,296 without allowing the public into the conversation
to see and decide what the video reveals about what happened in an
encounter. Alternatively, government adopts a one-way disclosure
policy, publicizing and speaking out about video that (in its view)
supports its officers and shows no misconduct, while refusing to
disclose images and recordings it views (or that the public is likely to
view) as adverse to police and government interests.297
A second, more positive, possibility is that public availability of
video evidence, however created, prompts institutions to be more
aggressive in challenging police misbehavior and seeking
accountability for misconduct.298 There arguably has been a gradual
shift in prosecutorial aggressiveness against police violence, especially
in video cases, moving from the relative dark ages of 2014 to the
present.
NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo was not indicted for the 2014
strangulation death of Eric Garner299 and Cleveland police officers
Timothy Loehmann and Frank Garmback were not indicted in the
2014 shooting death of Tamir Rice,300 despite widely circulated video
(from non-police sources) of both incidents. More recent cases have
resulted in criminal charges and prosecutions—Ray Tensing in the
shooting death of Samuel DuBose at the University of Cincinnati,301
Yeonimo Yanez in the shooting death of Philando Castile in
Minnesota,302 Jason Stockley in the shooting death of Anthony Lamar
Smith in St. Louis, and Philip Brailsford in the shooting death of
Daniel Shaver in Mesa, Arizona.303 Charges remain pending against
multiple Chicago police officers for the 2015 shooting death of
Laquan McDonald, where dashcam video, produced only after a
state-court suit and judicial order compelling disclosure, told the
296. Harris, Collection and Use Panel Discussion at the North Carolina Law Review
Symposium, supra note 11.
297. Wasserman, Uncertain Hope, supra note 48, at 228–29.
298. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 644–45.
299. J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests after Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict
Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-statenisland-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html [https://perma.cc/4BAS-7CXS (dark archive)].
300. Scruggs, supra note 98.
301. Jess Bidgood & Richard Pérez-Peña, Mistrial in Cincinnati Shooting as Officer is
Latest Not to Be Convicted, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06
/23/us/raymond-tensing-samuel-dubose-cincinnati.html
[https://perma.cc/PM5E-ZL4M
(dark archive)].
302. Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y.
TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-trialphilando-castile.html [https://perma.cc/BT74-SBT7 (dark archive)].
303. Berman et al., supra note 73; Stahl, supra note 113.
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public a different story from official accounts and helped expose an
attempted cover-up.304 A hung jury in the state homicide prosecution
of Michael Slager in the shooting death of Walter Scott in South
Carolina led to a federal civil rights prosecution of Slager for
depriving Scott of his Fourth Amendment rights,305 a guilty plea, and
a twenty-year federal prison sentence.306
The results of these cases may not reflect positive outcomes or
what many regard, based on their interpretations of the videos, as
justice. Each prosecution in the first list was unsuccessful, resulting in
acquittals or hung juries (sometimes multiple hung juries). Only
Slager seems likely to serve prison time. Acquittals accompanied by
graphic video, such as in the Shaver shooting, reinforce the cynical
public belief that no amount of evidence is sufficient to convict a
police officer. But the increased efforts suggest some limited
movement toward success. State and federal prosecutors appear more
willing to pursue criminal charges when video evidence, at least
viscerally, supports a view that the officer did something
constitutionally violative.
Bryce Newell identifies an irony to this evolution. The demand
for body-cams and video in police-shooting cases, including among
rank-and-file police officers, began following the unrecorded shooting
of Michael Brown in Ferguson. Subsequent cases featured video of
some sort from some source, resulting in prosecutions but not
necessarily accountability, while turning rank-and-file officers against
cameras as a law-enforcement tool.307
A third possibility is that video of a police-citizen incident
prompts municipalities to expeditiously settle civil rights suits. The
government avoids further public viewing, discussion, and debate

304. Catherine Thorbecke, Chicago Police Officer Charged with Murder of Teen
Laquan McDonald Hired by Police Union, ABC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2016),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/chicago-police-officer-charged-murder-teen-laquan-mcdonald
/story?id=38052352 [https://perma.cc/8P8V-RQRM].
305. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2016).
306. Alan Blinder, Ex-Officer Who Shot Walter Scott Pleads Guilty in Charleston, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/us/michael-slager-walter-scottnorth-charleston-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/V5P3-QWXX (dark archive)]; Steve
Osunsami & Emily Shapiro, Ex-Cop Michael Slager Sentenced to 20 Years for Shooting
Death of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/US/cop-michaelslager-faces-19-24-years-prison/story?id=51595376 [https://perma.cc/29R9-AJVG (dark
archive)].
307. Newell & Greidanus, supra note 20, at 1554–57.
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over video that is subjectively perceived as troubling, reducing the
potential that anger erupts into public demonstrations.308
Public attention and outrage over a viral video puts the
government on its heels; it must defend its officers while reacting to
adverse public perceptions and conclusions. The result is a split
response—no criminal, administrative, or employment actions against
the officers, but settlement as the path of least resistance in
subsequent § 1983 or wrongful-death actions. The families of Scott,
McDonald, Garner, DuBose, and Castile settled with the officers and
municipalities for anywhere from $3 million to $6.5 million, often
before or just after filing the lawsuit,309 even while the officers in each
case escaped criminal punishment. Smith’s family settled for $900,000,
although allegations that the state withheld DNA evidence during
settlement negotiations (evidence that may have allowed the family to
place a higher value on the case) may cause the court to reopen
discovery and the settlement.310
Katherine MacFarlane describes these civil cases as utilizing
“accelerated civil rights settlement.”311 Plaintiffs bring or threaten
small-bore § 1983 claims; they seek damages for the single event at
issue, but not systemic departmental reform through broad injunctive
relief; and the parties settle before or shortly after filing.312 While
these lawsuits do not achieve systemic police reform, the settlements
are with the municipality (rather than the officers313) and are
substantial enough to add-up and incentivize the government to
reform its training, supervision, policies, and programs to avoid future
lawsuits and payments.314 Video, and fear of the public reaction to
video that looks “bad,” prompts the government to pursue or accept
308. See Mary D. Fan, Hacking Qualified Immunity: Camera Power and Civil Rights
Settlements, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 51, 63 (2017); Wasserman, supra note 2, at 644–45.
309. See Katherine A. MacFarlane, Accelerated Civil Rights Settlements In the Shadow
of Section 1983 ,2018 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4–13, 15–16);
Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Family Reaches $3 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/philando-castile-family-settlement.html
[https://perma.cc/2FNE-KG32 (dark archive)]; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, University of
Cincinnati to Pay $ 4.85 Million to Family of Man Killed by Officer, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/us/university-of-cincinnati-to-pay-4-85-millionto-family-of-man-killed-by-officer.html [https://perma.cc/MD64-VZSW (dark archive)].
310. Jack Suntrup, Attorney Moves to Reopen Discovery in Anthony Lamar Smith Civil
Suit, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime
-and-courts/attorney-moves-to-reopen-discovery-in-anthony-lamar-smith-civil/article
_d03e5c92-2322-597b-bc19-d2d17387bb63.html [https://perma.cc/7V9S-P6UL].
311. MacFarlane, supra note 309, at 1.
312. See id. at 5–6, 17.
313. See Schwartz, supra note 225, at 890–91.
314. See MacFarlane, supra note 309, at 20–21, 32–33, 35.
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accelerated settlement, ending the legal dispute and any popular
debate and controversy around the video and the problematic police
encounter.
A final, ironic, option is for government to undertake the
difficult task of warning the public not to jump to conclusions about
what happened because video is incomplete, non-objective, subject to
the limits of the video frame, and open to varying interpretations
based on the viewer’s political and personal perspectives. Officials
can urge the public to accept that one video does not tell the whole
story and to wait until they see and hear more video, more evidence,
and more sides to the story. In other words, the solution is for
government to discuss video in honest and accurate terms.
But if the public’s brute-sense impression is that the video is
unfavorable to the police, as in the settled high-profile death cases,
this argument may prove practically and politically impossible.315 This
tactic also contradicts the government position, in and out of
litigation, when officials are confident in video’s officer-supportive
message. In those cases, they insist that video is singular, conclusive,
objective, unambiguous, and tells one story that exonerates the officer
on summary judgment316 or justifies the decision not to pursue
criminal charges against the officer. The cognitive dissonance and
charges of political hypocrisy may be too much to overcome.
CONCLUSION
Public discussion of the benefits of video-recording cannot be
disconnected from the legal and judicial processes within which video
gets used and in which the benefits of video—police accountability,
police reform, and enforcement and vindication of individual rights—
will be obtained. Whether video achieves its aims depends on how
prosecutors, juries, grand juries, and judges process video and
understand how to process video; procedural limitations on
enforcement of constitutional rights; and public reactions to the legal
process grounded in their own processing of video. It is important to
talk about whether law enforcement should establish body-camera
programs and the details of those programs; it is important to talk
about whether the First Amendment protects a right to record. But it
is essential that those conversations consider and account for the
procedural problems considered here.
315. Wasserman, supra note 2, at 645–47.
316. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–22 (2014); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 379–80 (2007).

